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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Federal law confers various protections on United 
States servicemembers called to active duty. Among these are 
limits on the interest and penalties that may be charged to a 
servicemember for overdue property taxes. Michael Davis, 
who served his country in both Iraq and Afghanistan, appeals 
the District Court’s order dismissing his lawsuit challenging 
delinquent property tax interest and penalties that the City of 
Philadelphia assessed against his company while he was on 
active duty. The question presented by this appeal is whether 
the protections afforded to Davis as a servicemember extend 
to his company’s property.  
I 
 Davis and his wife purchased a two-story, three-
bedroom rental property at 5624 Willows Avenue in 
Philadelphia on July 15, 1997. A longtime member of the 
United States Army Reserve, Davis was called to active duty 
in December 2004. A few months after he was called up, 
Davis and his wife transferred the property to Global Sales 
Call Center LLC, a Pennsylvania company that is solely 
owned and managed by Davis.1 Davis served six months of 
active duty in Iraq in 2005 and three years in Afghanistan 
between 2008 and 2011.  
                                              
 1 The Davises did so to “insulate themselves from 
liability because [Davis] was on active duty [in the Army] 
and his wife was unable to manage the property.” Davis v. 
City of Philadelphia, 2015 WL 4461770, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 
July 21, 2015). 
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 In December 2009, Davis and Global asked the 
Philadelphia Department of Revenue to reduce Global’s 
property tax debt in accordance with the Servicemembers 
Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 U.S.C. § 3901 et seq., which 
limits any interest imposed on a servicemember’s delinquent 
property taxes during his period of active duty to a rate of six 
percent and forbids any additional penalties.2 50 U.S.C. §§ 
3991(d), 3937(a)(1).  The Department denied this request on 
the grounds that the SCRA does not apply to a business 
owned by a servicemember, telling Davis that he should 
instead file an abatement petition with the Philadelphia Tax 
Review Board. Davis did so in January 2010, rehashing his 
SCRA argument and requesting a recalculation of the interest 
and penalties assessed against Global based on its overdue 
property taxes. The Review Board denied the petition after a 
March 2011 hearing.  
 Two years later the City of Philadelphia initiated 
foreclosure proceedings on Global’s property because of its 
failure to pay the delinquent property taxes and associated 
interest and penalties, and the Philadelphia Court of Common 
Pleas entered judgment in the City’s favor. In a subsequent 
hearing upon a petition to open the judgment, Davis again 
requested an abatement of Global’s debt, reasserting that the 
interest and penalties assessed by the City violated the SCRA 
and neglecting to inform the Court that the Review Board had 
already considered and rejected this argument. After learning 
of the Review Board’s decision, the Court of Common Pleas 
ruled in the City’s favor and signed the foreclosure petition.  
 Davis and Global then turned to federal court, suing 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “provides a recovery 
mechanism for the deprivation of a federal right by a person 
acting under color of state law.” Hynson By & Through 
Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dep’t, 864 F.2d 1026, 1029 
(3d Cir. 1988). The City moved to dismiss, arguing that it had 
applied the SCRA to Davis’s personal liabilities (those arising 
                                              
 2 Davis alleges that nearly half of the $17,120.47 
demanded by the City in back taxes and court costs is illegal 
under the SCRA.  
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during the brief period between Davis’s transition to active 
duty and his transfer of the Willows Avenue property to 
Global) and that both Davis and Global lack standing.  
 The District Court granted the City’s motion. The 
Court reasoned that the SCRA extends only to 
servicemembers and that a corporation is not a 
“servicemember” under the statute. Davis v. City of 
Philadelphia, 2015 WL 4461770, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 
2015). Accordingly, it concluded that Global was without 
statutory standing to seek relief under the SCRA. Id. The 
Court also dismissed Davis’s suit, holding that—because he 
was not personally liable for Global’s tax debt—he “has not 
been denied relief under the SCRA.” Id.  
 Global did not appeal, but Davis did.3  
II 
 This appeal is our first opportunity to interpret the 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. This straightforward statute 
provides that any interest imposed on a servicemember’s late 
property taxes during a period of active duty may not exceed 
six percent. 50 U.S.C. §§ 3991(a), (d), 3937(a), and 
3911(2)(A)(i), (3).  The law also bars any additional charges 
or interest under the guise of a “penalty.” 50 U.S.C. 
§ 3991(d). These property tax interest rate and penalty 
protections extend only to “property . . . owned individually 
by a servicemember or jointly by a servicemember and a 
dependent or dependents.” 50 U.S.C. § 3991(e) (emphasis 
added). The SCRA defines a “servicemember” as “a member 
of the uniformed services.” 50 U.S.C. § 3911(1). 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. We reject the City’s odd suggestion that our 
inquiry is merely whether the District Court’s order is 
“clearly erroneous” or amounts to an abuse of discretion. City 
Br. 8, 13, 16; but see id. at 14–15 (correctly identifying our 
standard of review). Our review is plenary. Ballentine v. 
United States, 486 F.3d 806, 808 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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 Although the parties view this case purely in terms of 
standing, we see it somewhat differently. As we shall explain, 
Global lacks standing, but Davis does have standing to sue.  
 Standing is a sine qua non in any case. See Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). There are three types of 
standing: (1) constitutional standing owing to the “irreducible 
constitutional minimum” of the existence of an Article III 
“case or controversy,” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560 (1992); (2) prudential standing consistent with 
“judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction,” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685 
(2013); and (3) statutory standing, which is at issue in this 
case. Whereas “[c]onstitutional and prudential standing are 
about, respectively, the constitutional power of a federal court 
to resolve a dispute and the wisdom of so doing,” statutory 
standing is simply a matter of statutory interpretation. Graden 
v. Conexant Sys. Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 2007). We 
inquire “whether Congress has accorded this injured plaintiff 
the right to sue the defendant to redress his injury.” Id.  
Applying these principles, the District Court correctly 
held that Global is not a “servicemember” under the SCRA, 
as it is not a “member of the uniformed services.” 50 U.S.C. 
§ 3911(1). Although federal law treats corporations as 
“people” in many respects, it does not deem them soldiers. 
Moreover, the SCRA limits the class of persons who may 
petition a court for relief under the Act to those with 
“servicemember” status. 50 U.S.C. § 4021(a). Thus, the plain 
language of the SCRA precludes Global’s standing. 
Unlike Global, Davis is a servicemember. As such, he 
is precisely the sort of plaintiff that the SCRA protects. 
Contrary to the City’s arguments and the District Court’s 
implicit holding, his complaint is not defeated for lack of 
statutory standing.  
Unfortunately for Davis, he has not—and cannot—
state a claim for relief under the SCRA. “To survive a motion 
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 
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quotation marks omitted). To state a claim for relief, Davis 
was required to plead facts sufficient to prove the following 
elements of a SCRA claim: (1) an interest at a rate above six 
percent (2) assessed against a servicemember while on active 
duty (3) based on delinquent property taxes relating to 
“property . . . owned individually by a servicemember or 
jointly by a servicemember and a dependent or dependents.” 
50 U.S.C. § 3991(e) (emphasis added). Davis cannot satisfy 
the second or third elements because it is undisputed that 
Global owns the property in question and that Global alone is 
liable for the tax debt.4 Under Pennsylvania law, Global has 
its own legal identity, so Davis may not invoke the SCRA on 
Global’s behalf. Nor may Davis appeal to equity to pierce 
Global’s corporate veil based purely on the unremarkable fact 
that Global has no corporate shareholders or personnel 
beyond Davis and absent any evidence that the entity was 
nothing but a sham, as it is well established that “[m]ere stock 
ownership by a small number of shareholders does not blur 
the distinction between individual and corporate entities.” In 
re Deed of Trust of Rose Hill Cemetery Ass’n, 590 A.2d 1, 4 
(Pa. 1991); see also Sams v. Redevelopment Auth. of City of 
New Kensington, 244 A.2d 779, 781 (Pa. 1968) (“[O]ne 
cannot choose to accept the benefits incident to a corporate 
enterprise and at the same time brush aside the corporate form 
when it works to their (shareholders’) detriment.”); Barium 
Steel Corp. v. Wiley, 108 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. 1954) (“The fact 
that one person owns all of the stock does not make him and 
the corporation one and the same person.”). 
Contrary to Davis’s argument, an SCRA provision 
circumscribing the obligations of servicemember-owned 
businesses hurts—not helps—his case. That provision states 
that “[i]f the trade or business . . . of a servicemember has an 
obligation or liability for which the servicemember is 
personally liable, the assets of the servicemember not held in 
connection with the trade or business may not be available 
for satisfaction of the obligation or liability during the 
servicemember’s military service.” 50 U.S.C. § 4026(a) 
                                              
 4 Davis concedes that the City has applied the SCRA 
to his personal liabilities.  
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(emphases added). This simply means that “business creditors 
cannot execute on the servicemember’s non-business assets to 
satisfy business debt.” Newton v. Bank of McKenney, 2012 
WL 1752407, at *6 (E.D. Va. May 16, 2012). A “necessary 
corollary to this rule is that business creditors are allowed to 
execute on the servicemember’s business assets to satisfy 
business debt, even if the servicemember is personally liable 
for that business debt.” Id. (emphases added). Hence, even in 
the event that some or all of the money owed by Global to the 
City effectively comes out of Davis’s pocket, nothing in the 
SCRA would stand in the way so long as his non-business 
assets are respected.  
III 
It is an unfortunate twist of law and fate that Davis and 
his wife, in transferring their rental property to Global in 
order to protect their financial interests during Davis’s period 
of military service, unwittingly undermined existing 
safeguards of those interests. Undoubtedly, denying these 
safeguards to Davis’s closely held company runs counter to 
the SCRA’s ambition that servicemembers feel secure in their 
tax and legal affairs during their active duty deployments so 
that they may “devote their entire energy to the defense needs 
of the Nation.” 50 U.S.C. § 3902(1). But Davis received all 
the benefits that come with incorporation, and he cannot have 
his cake and eat it too. The clear text of the SCRA limits its 
protections to property owned individually by a 
servicemember or jointly by a servicemember and a 
dependent. Because Global owns the property in question and 
the City has applied the SCRA’s protections to Davis’s 
personal liabilities, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
